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“Final” Awards Reconceptualized: A
Proposal to Resolve the Hall Street
Circuit Split
Matthew J. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
Before the Supreme Court decided Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc.,1 the federal appellate courts had generally agreed to the
existence of non-statutory grounds for the vacatur of arbitral awards.2
Among these grounds, every circuit had adopted some form of the “manifest
disregard of the law” (manifest disregard) standard.3
Manifest disregard
most commonly refers to the principle that a court may vacate an arbitration
award if the arbitrator knows that a law applies and deliberately disregards

*Matthew J. Brown is a recent graduate of George Mason University School of Law, where he
served as a Notes Editor for the George Mason Law Review. While in law school, he received a
certificate in global arbitration law and practice from Hamline University School of Law, in
cooperation with Queen Mary, University of London. Before law school he obtained a B.A. from
Wake Forest University. He is currently Research Director at the Institute of International Banking
Law and Practice. He is also coaching the Kabul University Vis Moot Team in the 11th Willem C.
Vis (East) International Commercial Arbitration Moot. The author would like to thank Professors
Ross E. Davies and Thomas E. Carbonneau for their thoughtful suggestions during the writing
process, and Angela Diveley and Brian Ziff-Levine for their invaluable editing advice. Most
importantly, he would like to thank his fiancée Kristin Gilroy for her love, patience, and support
without which this Comment would not have been possible.
1. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
2. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 443, 450–51 (1998).
3. Reid S. Manley & Zachary D. Miller, Disregarding “Manifest Disregard”: The Effect of
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc. and Its Progeny on the Standard for Arbitral Review,
FDCC Q., at 357, 360 (Summer 2010) (citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456,
1460 (11th Cir. 1997)); accord James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745, 763 (2009) (“Following Wilko, every
circuit ultimately adopted manifest disregard of the law as a separate ground for vacatur of an
award.”); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur after Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1103, 1111 (2009); Ann C. Gronlund, Note, The Future of Manifest Disregard as a Valid
Ground for Vacating Arbitration Awards in Light of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Hall Street
Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 96 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1359 (2011).
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it, rather than vacating the award for misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law.4 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall Street, it did so
solely to answer the question whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).5
“preclude[d] a federal court from enforcing the parties’ clearly expressed
agreement providing for more expansive judicial review of an arbitration
award.”6 However, in the process of answering this question, the Court
inadvertently cast doubt on the continued validity of all non-statutory
grounds for vacatur.7 In the wake of Hall Street, a sharp split has occurred
among the circuit courts as to the continuing validity of manifest disregard.8
The FAA does not grant courts the authority to review the merits of an
arbitrator’s decision.9 Yet, despite the doctrine’s widespread acceptance,
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (9th ed. 2009); see McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts.
Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[W]e mean by ‘manifest disregard of the law’ a situation
‘where it is clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law—and then ignored
it.’”) (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990)); Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess
of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 1 (2009), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/
pdfs/817.pdf (“Manifest disregard is a common-law exception to the limited grounds for vacatur of
arbitral awards enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). [The] doctrine empowers courts to
refuse to enforce awards that evince a ‘manifest disregard of the law,’ understood to mean a willful
defiance of clearly applicable law, not just garden-variety legal error.”).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
6. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576
(2008) (No. 06-989); see Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 581.
7. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 3 (“If the FAA standards are ‘exclusive,’ are judicially-crafted
vacatur standards—which almost all circuits have recognized in the guise of ‘manifest
disregard,’ . . . —no longer viable?” (footnote omitted)).
8. Compare Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010), Med. Shoppe
Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010), and Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v.
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009), with Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d
1277 (9th Cir. 2009), & Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008),
rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
9. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 132–33 n.48 (2002) (explaining that the drafters of the
FAA specifically rejected the “English model that allowed judicial review of arbitration award for
legal questions, and . . . insiste[d] that ‘once the parties have agreed upon arbitration, they must
accept the result the arbitrator reaches no matter how obviously and plainly wrong it appears’”)
(quoting Wharton Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute, 36 YALE L.J. 667, 676–78 (1927)).
Courts and commentators take this notion for granted today. So much so, they often do not even
provide citations when making the claim, perhaps believing the notion self-evident from the statute.
See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (“[A] party who has not
agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court’s decision about the merits of its dispute
(say, as here, its obligation under a contract). But, where the party has agreed to arbitrate, he or she,
in effect, has relinquished much of that right’s practical value.”); Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., No.
11-55587, 2012 WL 336135, at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2012) (“Indeed, § 10 of the FAA provides no
authorization for a merits review.”); White Springs Agric. Chems., Inc. v. Glawson Invs. Corp., 660
F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Even though White Springs presents its argument in terms of the
FAA, it asks us to do what we may not—look to the legal merits of the underlying award.”);
Southco, Inc. v. Reell Precision Mfg. Corp., 331 F. App’x 925, 927 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that
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courts and commentators alike have questioned and condemned manifest
disregard as a potential “back door” to merits review.10 In its Hall Street
decision, the Court likewise displayed uneasiness with manifest disregard,
focusing its attention on the underpinnings of the doctrine.11 This seems to
suggest the tenuous footing manifest disregard currently holds will give way,
and the Court will officially eliminate the doctrine. Nonetheless, the Court
has remained reluctant to jettison the nearly fifty-year-old doctrine.12
Seeking to ease the reluctance, this Comment argues that manifest
disregard’s inconsistencies with arbitration’s “benefits of the bargain”
should lead to dismissal of manifest disregard. The prospect of the Court
formally abandoning manifest disregard has set off alarm bells for some.
One commentator even went so far as to state that “[i]f ‘manifest disregard’
is eliminated, arbitral finality will rise above the crowning principle of the
American constitutional system: ‘No man in this country is so high that he is
above the law.’”13 However, absent manifest disregard, the FAA had

“parties to the contract may not appeal the merits of the arbitration”); Brief of Arbitration Professors
Richard C. Reuben, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal of the
District Court Order, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3247-cv),
available at http://law.missouri.edu/news/pdf/reuben_amicus_brief.pdf; THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 541 (5th ed. 2009)
(summarily stating that “FAA § 10 does not recognize merits review”).
10. E.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner,
J.) (“If [manifest disregard] is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the back door, it is
inconsistent with the entire modern law of arbitration.”); CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 541 (“[T]he
common-law grounds [including manifest disregard] appear to authorize the courts to review the
merits of arbitral determinations.”); Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1 (“[Manifest disregard] opens the
door to judicial review of the legal merits of arbitral awards, which modern arbitration law has long
viewed as inimical to core process values such as efficiency and finality.”).
11. See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 585 (“Then there is the vagueness of Wilko’s phrasing.
Maybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it
merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.”); infra Part I.C.
(discussing the history and development of manifest disregard).
12. To date, the Court has granted certiorari for only one case in which manifest disregard was
at issue; however, the Court specifically declined to decide the continued validity of manifest
disregard. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767–68 n.3 (2010) (“We
do not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in [Hall Street] as an independent
ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C.
§ 10.”).
13. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law”
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 137 (2011).
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already granted courts the authority to review arbitral awards without
disturbing their merits.14
While the arbitration process provides the mechanism for the resolution
of disputes, it possesses no internal mechanism for enforcement. If a
disappointed party refuses to abide by an arbitral award, the prevailing party
must then turn to a court to seek enforcement.15 Accordingly, the arbitration
process rests on the foundation that a court will enforce the arbitral award.16
At least in the international context, where a court finds an award
unenforceable, that award demonstrates a lack of finality.17 This Comment
suggests a common sense approach, since there is nothing truly final about
an unenforceable arbitral award. Specifically, this Comment argues that the
word “final,” as it appears in FAA § 10(a)(4),18 requires the enforceability of
an award in addition to its traditional definition. In practice, the
reconceptualization consists of a two-step process. A court must first
determine whether an award, as written, is enforceable and therefore “final”
under section 10(a)(4). If, on the other hand, the award is not final, the court
must then decide whether the award can be modified without disturbing its
merits under section 11(c).19

14. The FAA provides courts with three options for the review of arbitral awards:
enforcement, vacatur or modification. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006).
15. See Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748 (“The private practice of arbitration [is] of little
practical use without the authority of court enforcement . . . .”); see also Richard C. Reuben, Process
Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 282
(2007) (“[E]nforceability is crucial because many parties can reasonably be expected simply to
ignore an adverse award if it is not binding.”).
16. See Reuben, supra note 15, at 282 (“Without enforceability, arbitrators would only be able
to issue what in effect would be advisory opinions.”).
17. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 419 (2d ed. 1991). “Lack of finality of an award may manifest itself in
a number of ways, and lead to refusal of enforcement under the provisions of law governing the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.” Id.
18. The subsection provides as follows:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of
any party to the arbitration—
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
19. Federal Arbitration Act § 11(c) allows “the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration— . . . [w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy. The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect
the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.” 9 U.S.C. § 11(c).
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Part I describes the histories of arbitration, the FAA, the finality of
arbitral awards, and the manifest disregard doctrine, emphasizing the way in
which the doctrine deprives parties of the benefits of the arbitration bargain.
Part II describes the circuit split over the continued validity of manifest
disregard as either a valid or invalid statutory or non-statutory ground for
vacatur. Finally, Part III resolves the split by abolishing manifest disregard
and then reconceptualizing “final” as currently understood under
section 10(a)(4) through the two-step procedure.20
I.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF ARBITRATION AND ARBITRATION LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES

A. Arbitration and the Benefits of the Arbitration Bargain
Arbitration as a mechanism for dispute resolution has existed since
some of the earliest days of recorded history.21
The arbitration process
developed because parties wished to resolve their disputes in a more
efficient and expeditious manner than that provided by traditional courts.22
The arbitration process formalized and expanded with the development of
Lex Mercatoria (Law Merchant).23 The Law Merchant evolved in the early
Court Merchant fairs where itinerant merchants valued efficiency and
finality in the resolution of disputes, since, as traveling merchants, they

20. The scope of this Comment pertains to arbitrations as originally envisioned by the FAA,
namely as a mechanism for dispute resolution between sophisticated commercial parties who
bargained at arms’ length. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal
Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 279 (1926) (“Arbitration under the Federal and similar statutes
is simply a new procedural remedy, particularly adapted to the settlement of commercial
disputes . . . . No one is required to make an agreement to arbitrate. Such action by a party is
entirely voluntary.”) Compare id. at 278 (“An agreement for arbitration is a business contract.”).
To the extent that arbitration has expanded beyond this original context, many of the same principles
can and should be applied; however, such application warrants further scholarship. For such a
discussion included in the context of abandoning the manifest disregard standard, see generally,
Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547 (2005).
21. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 266; see Reuben, supra note 15, at 279 (“Arbitration
became formalized in the commercial context with the rise of the craftsmen’s gilds and Court
Merchant fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.”).
22. See Reuben, supra note 3, at 1104 (describing the “very predicate” of arbitration and the
alternative dispute resolution process generally as the notion that “parties can do a better job of
resolving their disputes through private ordering than public courts can through public ordering”).
23. Reuben, supra note 15, at 279.
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could not remain long in a single community.24 The Law Merchant became
“a special law administered by special Courts for a special class of
people.”25 In other words, the Law Merchant and its arbitration process
developed alongside and outside of the common law.26
Under the Law Merchant, in contrast to the common law, arbitration did
not develop a unified code of substantive principles, instead largely
remaining a matter of free decision.27 In place of the substantive principles,
fellow merchants would judge each case in terms of practical expediency,
often grounding their decisions in the ethical or economic norms of the
particular groups to which the disputing merchants belonged.28 After
a
dispute arose, but prior to the commencement of arbitration, the parties
delegated the authority to resolve the dispute to the arbitrators through a
contract or sometimes as a requirement of membership in a particular
merchant gild.29
To proceed to arbitration in modern times, parties must formally agree
to arbitrate their disputes.30 As a result, arbitration is a creature of contract.31
Within the arbitration agreement, parties may consent to a set of governing
adjudication principles and procedures by which a neutral third party shall
resolve the dispute.32 Essentially, the arbitration agreement acts as an optout provision from the court system, bypassing traditional judges in favor of

24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 279 n.44 (quoting Thomas Edward Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the
Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 7, 9 (1909)).
26. WINDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT (Fred B. Rothman &
Co. 1986) (1923) (describing “the custom of merchants [as being] recognized as a law apart from the
common law”); see also Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 747 (“Law Merchant [] developed in
England to address the particular needs of merchants that the common law did not serve.”). For an
extended discussion on the history of conflict between the Law Merchant and the common law, see
JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 71–83 (1918).
27. Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
132, 132 (1934).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 133.
30. CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 2; see Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 281
(“Arbitration under the law depends upon a written instrument.”).
31. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)
(“Arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those
disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”); H.R. REP.
NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract . . . .”); see Cohen &
Dayton, supra note 20, at 278 (“An agreement for arbitration is a business contract. It should be as
inviolable as any other business contract, and once it is violated the law should give an adequate
remedy.”).
32. See Reuben, supra note 3, at 1104; see Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 747 (describing the
“grant of powers to arbitrators via submission to the process”).
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a neutral third party.33 When the parties consent, the agreement binds them
to the arbitrator’s determination.34
As with other bargained-for exchanges, arbitration has benefits to its
bargain.35 Among them, finality and efficiency stand out as the primary
benefits of the arbitration bargain.36 To avoid the inflexible adherence to
substantive and procedural law promised by the court system, “parties often
agree to arbitrate precisely because they desire a streamlined process that
emphasizes efficiency and the preservation of business relationships over
technical fidelity to the law.”37 Indeed, as Professor Richard Reuben
observes, “the notion of substantive ‘correctness’ or ‘accuracy’ historically
has had little place in arbitration precisely because arbitration calls for the
exercise of worldly judgment that is informed by a variety of considerations
that may not lend themselves to an objective notion of correctness or
accuracy.”38 By bargaining for a streamlined and final process, parties to
arbitration opt out of the high costs, long delays, and contentious discovery
that often attend litigation.39 In other words, the benefit of the arbitration

33. Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006); Reuben, supra note 3, at
1104 (“[A]rbitration empowers parties to choose to opt out of public ordering from the outset . . . .”).
34. See Reuben, supra note 15, at 282 (“Like those of public judges, the decisions of
commercial arbitrators are fully enforceable by the public courts when the parties agree that the
award is to be binding . . . .”); see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 267 (“A written provision
for arbitration . . . is made valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon the grounds for which any
contract may be revoked.”) (internal quotations omitted).
35. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1:1 (4th ed.1993 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS] (“The goal of contract
law is to hold parties to their agreements so that they receive the benefits of their bargains.”); cf. 2
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1999 &
Supp. 2011) (identifying bases for the enforcement of an informal contract at common law as
including “something given as an agreed exchange, benefits received by the promisor, [or]
detriments incurred by the promisee”); id. at § 5.9 (“There is no doubt that most enforceable
promises are made by the promisor for the purpose of getting in return something that the promisor
regards as beneficial. Promises are made to pay for work, goods or title to land. If bargained for,
these beneficial subjects of exchange are consideration for a promise.”).
36. See Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1 (referring to finality and efficiency as the “core process
values” of arbitration); Hayford, supra note 2, at 505 (describing the final and binding nature of the
arbitrator’s award as the “bargain inherent in the agreement to arbitrate”); Stephen L. Hayford,
Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of
Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 117, 118 (1998) (describing finality as “the process[‘s] . . . most
essential feature”).
37. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 11.
38. Reuben, supra note 15, at 282.
39. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (“[A] party ‘trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
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bargain consists of the finality and efficiency of the arbitrator’s decision
because that is what the parties have bargained for in place of a traditional
court proceeding.40
Similar to other types of contracts, arbitration agreements involve risks
particular to their bargain.41 This risk lies in the potentially adverse arbitral
decision coupled with limited judicial review.42 As stated though, this risk is
balanced by a potentially favorable arbitral award coupled with the
adversary’s limited right to judicial review.43 Arbitration also includes the
inherent risk of what Professor Reuben terms “abnormal awards.”44
This
potential cannot be allowed to undermine the arbitral process, however,
because “the possibility of the abnormal award is simply one of those risks
that is a part of the parties’ bargain to arbitrate.”45 As such, parties must
account for this risk at the contracting stage, rather than at the enforcement
stage when one of the parties has already realized part of the bargain. After
all, freely entered arbitration agreements have the same force of law as any
other contract.46 As Professor Samuel Williston once noted:
The goal of contract law is to hold parties to their agreements so that they receive the
benefits of their bargains. It is not the function of the courts to relieve a party to a freely

expedition of arbitration.’”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Reuben, supra note 3, at 1129–30; Reuben, supra note 15, at 279
(“[A]rbitration can be faster and cheaper than the courts, in part because it averts the long waiting
time for a trial in some jurisdictions, the large legal and expert witness fees generated by extensive
pre-trial discovery and long, complex trials, and the delay to the implementation of an adjudicatory
decision that can be caused by appeals.”).
40. Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court:
Contemplating the Use and Utility of the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV.
241, 259–60 (1993) (quoting Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
41. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 35, at § 1:1 (“[Contract law] is intended to
enforce the expectancy interests created by the parties’ promises so that they can allocate risks and
costs during their bargaining.”); cf. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (describing the “normal risk of a fixed-price contract” as the possibility
“that the market price will change. If it rises, the buyer gains at the expense of the seller . . . if it
falls, as here, the seller gains at the expense of the buyer.”).
42. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (“By
including an arbitration clause in their contract the parties agree to submit disputes arising out of the
contract to a nonjudicial forum, and we do not allow the disappointed party to bring his dispute into
court by the back door, arguing that he is entitled to appellate review of the arbitrators’ decision.”);
cf. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1148.
43. See supra note 39.
44. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1148. Although arbitration lacks the appellate procedures of
traditional adjudication that serve to “correct” or “normalize” judgments that might fall outside of
party expectations, this should not surprise parties to an arbitration proceeding, because “[w]hen
they contract to take their cases out of the public system, parties are opting for an informal system of
‘rough justice.’” Id.
45. See id.
46. Galbraith, supra note 40, at 259.
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negotiated contract of the burdens of a provision which becomes more onerous than had
47
originally been anticipated.

As a creature of contract, the tenets of contract law hold particular
significance to arbitration jurisprudence.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
At the same time arbitration developed as a means to resolve
commercial disputes, judicial animosity emerged against the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.48 English common law courts jealously guarded
their jurisdiction due to a concern that the specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements might impede or interfere with the regular judicial
administration of justice.49 This hostility developed before the common law
doctrine of binding contracts had fully formed.50 However, as contracts
became recognized as binding, arbitration agreements lagged behind and
judicial hostility persisted.51 Then, with the adoption of English common
law, the judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements became incorporated
in America.52 Unlike England, however, the special institutions that
supported the Law Merchant did not follow mercantilism to America,
leaving colonial merchants to find new ways of resolving their trade
disputes.53
Flourishing commerce in the United States highlighted the need for
decreased judicial hostility toward the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, finally coming to a head in the late 1910s.54 Although hesitant
to enforce agreements, judges were more willing to enforce awards rendered

47. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 35, at § 1:1.
48. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 746–47.
49. Id. (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 452 (1874)) (alterations original). For
an extended discussion of the common law doctrines of ouster and revocability by which courts
refused to enforce arbitration agreements, see Wolaver, supra note 27, at 138–44. See also Berger &
Sun, supra note 3, at 747–48.
50. COHEN, supra note 26, at 60–70; Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748 n.15.
51. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748 n.15 (citing Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the
Impact of Modern Arbitration on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 479, 489 (1995)).
52. Galbraith, supra note 40, at 245; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985) (describing “an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to
arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed from English common law.”).
53. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 747.
54. Id. at 748–53.
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after the parties had submitted their disputes to arbitration.55 In fact, some
courts did not philosophically oppose enforcing arbitration agreements but
for the persistence of the old common law doctrines which handcuffed these
judges from enforcing the agreements.56 Hence, the need arose to remove
the old common law doctrines and to give judges the proper tools to enforce
arbitration agreements.57 This climate of unenforceable agreements yet
enforceable awards provided the backdrop for the drafting of the FAA. As a
result, the statute focuses on the enforcement of arbitration agreements
rather than awards.58
The New York Chamber of Commerce, a driving force behind the
drafting of the FAA, wished to have a federal law to complement the newly
enacted New York state law, which enforced arbitration agreements.59 At
the time, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction refused to enforce
arbitration agreements without a federal statute.60 Enacted in 1925 as the
United States Arbitration Act, the FAA consists of sixteen provisions, “most
of which are quite brief” and “relatively cryptic.”61 The heart of the act,
contained in section 2, provides for the enforcement of valid arbitration

55. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
233, 244 (2008); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 270; e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 345
(1854) (“If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators,
after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law
or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of the
judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of
litigation.”).
56. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 38–39 (1924) [hereinafter Joint
Hearings] (brief of Julius Henry Cohen) (citing U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trin. Lake Petrol. Co., 222
F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); President of Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250
(1872)); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 274–75, 283 (citing same).
57. See Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 752 (describing the New York Arbitration Law—the
precursor and model for the FAA—as “provid[ing] the tools to the courts for enforcing a valid
agreement to arbitration”).
58. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding
Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 170 (2008); Gronlund, supra
note 3, at 1356–57; see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (“[T]he
purpose behind [the FAA’s] passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made
agreements to arbitrate.”); Reuben, supra note 15, at 285 (“The primary purpose of the FAA was
narrow: to repeal the centuries-old ‘ouster’ or ‘revocability’ doctrine, under which both English and
American courts refused to enforce commercial agreements to arbitrate.”) (internal citations
omitted).
59. Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 245 (citation omitted).
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68–401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)); Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 246 n.54.
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The
agreements in the same manner as any other enforceable contract.62
FAA then lays out the procedure for the enforcement of arbitral awards
except in certain circumstances such as fraud or corruption.63 In the event of
ambiguity or mistake, the FAA also provides for limited judicial
modification of arbitral awards so long as the merits of the controversy
remain unaffected.64 As Professor Thomas Carbonneau points out, “[t]he
FAA’s central provisions are sections 1, 2, 3, and 10—2 and 10 are all that is
really necessary.”65 Whatever grounds for vacatur that do exist, the
language of section 10 completely excludes the review of the merits of
arbitral decisions.66 For the purposes of this Comment, section 10(a)(4) lists
the relevant and disputed grounds for vacatur of an award.67
C. Functus Officio and the Finality of Arbitral Awards
As the Second Circuit stated in 1980, “[i]n order to be ‘final,’ an
arbitration award must be intended by the arbitrators to be their complete
determination of all claims submitted to them.”68
This
statement
encompasses the traditional notion of arbitral finality, where an arbitral
award is only considered “final” under § 10(a)(4) if it resolves the dispute to
such an extent that the parties need not litigate further to finalize their
obligations.69 However, this does not exhaust the discussion of arbitral
finality. While the judiciary still remained hostile to arbitration, judges
developed a doctrine aimed at “protecting” arbitrators who—lacking the
same institutional protections as judges—might be susceptible to outside

62. 9 U.S.C. § 2. By allowing the federal judiciary to enforce valid arbitration agreements,
this section enacted the overriding principle for the FAA’s drafting. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
63. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–10.
64. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
65. Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 246.
66. 9 U.S.C. § 10; Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 248; see Hayford, supra note 2, at 450
(“Nothing in section 10(a) . . . authorizes the courts to engage in substantive review of the
merits . . . of . . . arbitration awards.”); Hayford, supra note 36, at 117 (“On its face, Section 10(a)
does not sanction judicial inquiry of any sort into the merits of . . . arbitration awards.”).
67. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (describing two separate grounds for vacatur “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter was not made”).
68. Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1980).
69. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1110 (citing Conn. Tech. Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ.
Props., 102 F.3d 677, 686 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 80 (explaining
that under § 10 an arbitrator “must provide the parties with a ruling that resolves the dispute”).
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Latin for “task performed” or “office
pressures to revisit awards.70
performed,” the doctrine came to be known as functus officio.71
The Supreme Court defined the common-law rule in its 1863 decision
Bayne v. Morris72 as follows: “Arbitrators exhaust their power when they
make a final determination on the matters submitted to them. They have no
power after having made an award to alter it; the authority conferred on
them is then at an end.”73 Judge Richard Posner explained the doctrine
further:
The doctrine is based on the analogy of a judge who resigns his office and, having done
so, naturally cannot rule on a request to reconsider or amend his decision. Arbitrators are
ad hoc judges—judges for a case; and when the case is over they cease to be judges and
go back to being law professors or businessmen or whatever else they are in private life,
like Cincinnatus returning to his plow. The flaw in the analogy is that the judge’s
resignation does not deprive litigants of an opportunity to seek reconsideration of his
decisions. Motions to reconsider are simply directed to another judge. If the
“resignation” of the arbitrator from the case, in accordance with the doctrine of functus
officio, disables him from considering a motion for reconsideration, clarification,
amendment, or other modification, there is nobody to whom the parties can turn. The
result would be a gap in the system of arbitral justice that would make very little sense
that we can see. Not no sense. Once they return to private life, arbitrators are less
sheltered than sitting judges, and it is feared that disappointed parties will bombard them
with ex parte communications and that the arbitrators, not being professional judges or
74
subject to the constraints of judicial ethics, will yield. . . .

Simply put, the doctrine bars arbitrators from reexamining the merits of a
dispute once they have issued an award.75
At first glance, such a bar to reexamination seems to promote the
finality of arbitration.76 However, denying arbitrators the ability to revisit
awards allows uncertainties to foster, thereby actually producing greater
fodder for litigation, reducing arbitral finality, and reducing arbitration’s

70. Official & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union, Local No. 471 v. Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d
326, 331 (3d Cir. 1999). See Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int’l Union, Local
182B v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 845 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (“The doctrine
originated in the bad old days when judges were hostile to arbitration and ingenious at hamstringing
it. It is said to have been ‘nourished by the primitive view of the solemnity of all judgments.’”)
(quoting La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967) (internal
citations omitted).
71. Brownsville, 186 F.3d at 331; Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 845.
72. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 97 (1863).
73. Bayne, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 99.
74. Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 846–47.
75. Brownsville, 186 F.3d at 331 (citing Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985,
991 (3d Cir. 1997)); Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 845 (“The arbitrator has performed his office and
having done so has been discharged from it.”).
76. See La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967) (referring
to functus officio as a “policy of finality”).
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utility. 77 Thus, as judicial hostility to arbitration tempered and the common
law continued to develop, exceptions were carved out of the general doctrine
of functus officio.78 The Third Circuit recognized three particular exceptions
to the doctrine, including allowing arbitrators to correct an apparent error, to
render an award on a missed issue, and to clarify an ambiguity.79
These exceptions do not jeopardize the award’s finality because they do
“not in any way violate any policy relating to arbitration and would be
within the arbitrators’ power to pursue on their own motion.”80
Awards
containing ambiguities only provide greater uncertainty and therefore fodder
for litigation, increasing the likelihood for de novo judicial review.81 In
essence, the exceptions do not harm finality because the judge seeks
guidance for enforcement of the award rather than examining the merits of
the decision itself. On the other hand, by its very nature, the opportunity for
arbitrators to correct their awards creates a separate by-product antithetical
to the arbitration bargain: delay.
D. The Development of Manifest Disregard as a Non-statutory Ground for
Vacatur
Manifest disregard of law traces its roots to the Supreme Court’s 1953
decision in Wilko v. Swan.82 The decision involved the invalidation of an
arbitration agreement under the Securities Acts of 1933.83 Although
not
pertaining directly to the Court’s decision, some lower courts grabbed onto
specific language stated in dictum:
While it may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the
provisions of the Securities Act would “constitute grounds for vacating the award
pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,” (citation omitted) that failure

77. Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 847.
78. Id. at 846 (“Today, riddled with exceptions, it is hanging on by its fingernails . . . .”).
79. Brownsville, 186 F.3d at 331 (quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943
F.2d 327, 332 (3d Cir. 1991)).
80. La Vale, 378 F.2d at 573.
81. See Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1269 (“To now subject these
decisions to de novo review would destroy the finality for which the parties contracted and render
the exhaustive arbitration process merely a prelude to the judicial litigation which the parties sought
to avoid.”).
82. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by, Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
83. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. For an expansive discussion of the Wilko decision see Galbraith,
supra note 40, at 248–50.
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would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted [agreements to arbitrate] . . . the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators, in contrast to manifest disregard[,] are not
84
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.

The Court subsequently overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.85 Despite the Court’s rejection of the “old
judicial hostility to arbitration,” which it found pervaded the Wilko
opinion,86 the Court’s Wilko dicta has managed to endure.87
Evolving almost exclusively in the lower courts, manifest disregard has
not received much attention from the Supreme Court.88 In fact, prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, the Court had only mentioned
manifest disregard three times.89 Among those mentions, the Court’s most
“glowing” endorsement came in the form of parenthetical dicta.90
Despite
the Wilko statement’s lack of precedential value, it nonetheless helped to
prompt the widespread adoption of manifest disregard by the lower courts.91
The most common approach to the doctrine came from the Second
Circuit’s decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker.92
The Bobker approach essentially entails three parts: (1) the clear existence of
a governing law, (2) where the arbitrator knew of the controlling law, and
(3) yet the arbitrator “consciously disregarded or ignored the applicable
law.”93 Despite the generality of this approach, the numerous circuit court

84. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)); see
MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado about Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard
after Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 414 (2010) (“Some lower courts latched on to the Wilko
language and adopted the doctrine of manifest disregard . . . .”).
85. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
86. Id. at 480.
87. See Hayford, supra note 36, at 122 (“The broad acceptance of the ‘manifest disregard’ of
the law ground by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals demonstrates they do not question its
legitimacy and continued viability.”).
88. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 414. For an extensive discussion of the development of
lower court approaches to manifest disregard, see Hayford, supra note 36, at 122-24; Galbraith,
supra note 40, at 250–54.
89. Hayford, supra note 36, at 121–22 n.23.
90. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (citing Wilco v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953)) (“[P]arties [are] bound by arbitrator’s decision not in ‘manifest disregard’
of the law.”); see Hayford, supra note 36, at 121–22 n.23 (dismissively describing this Kaplan
mention as simply “a parenthetical phrase in dictum”).
91. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 414.
92. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
93. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 413 (citing Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
548 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)); see Merrill Lynch,
808 F.2d at 933 (“The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as arbitrator. Moreover, the term ‘disregard’
implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides
to ignore or pay no attention to it.”).
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opinions applying a manifest disregard standard have failed to advance a
unitary, clearly articulated, and easily replicated mode of analysis.94
A critical reason for this failure turns on whether an arbitrator has
merely misinterpreted the law or manifestly disregarded it.95 As the Court
stated in Wilko, “the arbitrator’s conception of the legal meaning
of . . . statutory requirements . . . cannot be examined,” because,
“interpretations of the law by the arbitrators . . . are not subject . . . to
judicial review for error in interpretation.”96
As Judge James Oakes
pondered, “How courts are to distinguish in the Supreme Court’s phrase
between ‘erroneous interpretation’ of a statute, or for that matter, a clause in
a contract, and ‘manifest disregard’ of it, we do not know: one man’s
‘interpretation’ may be another’s ‘disregard.’
Is an ‘irrational’
misinterpretation a ‘manifest disregard’?”97 Without bright guidelines,
courts and parties are left to determine the outer boundaries of the manifest
disregard standard on their own. Moreover, because arbitrators often have
no obligation to make formal findings of fact or to offer a rationale, courts
can speculate about whether arbitrators have manifestly disregarded an
applicable law or simply misinterpreted it.98 This, in effect, leaves the court
to “divine [the] arbitral state of mind.”99
Under such an amorphous standard, judicial review of the merits of
arbitral decisions becomes a clear possibility in spite of its total exclusion
from FAA § 10. Where manifest disregard allows courts to perform a de
novo review without recognizing it as such, the doctrine is inconsistent with
modern arbitration law.100 The primary reason for this inconsistency lies in

94. Hayford, supra note 36, at 122.
95. Courts do not disagree that manifest disregard should remain a narrow standard. Rather,
the doctrine’s ambiguity and variance pertains to where, exactly, the line exists between
misinterpretation of law and manifest disregard of it. See, e.g., Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d
680, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[Manifest disregard] cannot empower a District Court to conduct the
same de novo review of questions of law than an appellate court exercises over lower court
decisions. Indeed, we have in the past held that ‘it is clear that [manifest disregard] means more than
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.’” (quoting Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 949
F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
96. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953).
97. I/S Stavborg v. Nat’l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974).
98. Galbraith, supra note 40, at 260.
99. Hayford, supra note 36, at 135.
100. Baravati v. Josephtal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
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manifest disregard’s plain incompatibility with the finality of arbitration.101
Simply put, manifest disregard frustrates the arbitration agreement and the
benefit of its bargain.102
II. HALL STREET ASSOCIATES AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court sought to resolve a split among
the circuit courts over the viability of expanded judicial review of arbitral
awards by contract.103 By contracting for judicial review, parties to an
arbitration agreement ask for the vacatur of arbitral awards that do not
conform to legal standards agreed to in the arbitration agreement.104
However, in resolving the split, the Court in Hall Street raised new questions
regarding judicial review of arbitral awards.105 These questions have led to a
new circuit split over whether manifest disregard remains a valid ground for
vacatur of arbitral awards.106
A. The Decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. and the
New Circuit Split
In Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that parties could not contract for
expanded judicial review because FAA §§ 10 and 11 are the exclusive
grounds for vacatur or modification of arbitral awards.107
The parties at
issue in Hall Street agreed to arbitrate a dispute over an indemnification
claim, which had remained unresolved after a bench trial of a landlordtenant dispute.108 The parties included a clause in their arbitration agreement
which stated that the district court “shall vacate, modify or correct any
award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported by
substantial evidence or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are

101. Hayford, supra note 36, at 118 (“[Manifest disregard] rob[s] the [arbitration] process of its
most essential feature—finality—by giving parties disappointed with the result reached in arbitration
reason to believe they may be able to circumvent objectionable awards by resort to the courts.”).
102. See Galbraith, supra note 40, at 259 (“[P]roviding grounds for vacation outside the
Federal Arbitration Act . . . frustrates the intent of the parties who bargained for the arbitration
process to resolve their disputes.”).
103. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 745.
104. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1117.
105. Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review
of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 938 (2010); Gronlund, supra note 3, at 1363.
106. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1; Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 424; Gronlund, supra note 3,
at 1363.
107. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585–86 (2008).
108. Id. at 579.
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erroneous.”109 When the arbitral award—decided in favor of defendant
Mattel—stated that Mattel owed no indemnification because the Oregon
Drinking Water Quality Act did not apply to the terms of the lease, plaintiff
Hall Street Associates filed a motion for vacatur on the ground that this
exclusion constituted legal error.110 The district court agreed and vacated the
award, remanding it to the arbitrator.111 On remand, the arbitrator applied
the Oregon Act and reversed his decision.112
Following an extremely
complicated subsequent procedural history, the Supreme Court ultimately
granted review.113
Although the question before the Court specifically pertained to the
viability of contractually expanded judicial review,114 the
Court
also
responded to Hall Street’s argument that the Court’s Wilko decision
expanded the possibilities for judicial review beyond sections 10 and 11.115
Hall Street argued that the Wilko dicta—from which the doctrine of manifest
disregard derived116—showed that sections 10 and 11 could not be the
exclusive grounds for vacatur because manifest disregard was a further nonstatutory ground.117
In response, the Court rejected Hall Street’s argument because the
vagueness of the Wilko language did not support such a construction.118 The
Court rooted its rejection on the grounds that Hall Street asked the Court to
do exactly what the Wilko Court had refused—to find that arbitral awards
may be reviewed for general legal error.119 Next, the Court displayed its
uneasiness with manifest disregard by stating that “[m]aybe the term
‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe
it merely referred to the section 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding

109. Id.
110. Id. at 580.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. For an in depth discussion of the facts and the complicated procedural history of Hall
Street, see Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 770–71.
114. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 581. For the specific question upon which the Court granted
certiorari, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
115. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 581.
116. See supra Part I.C.
117. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584.
118. See id. at 585 (“Hall Street sees this supposed addition [of manifest disregard] to § 10 as
the camel’s nose: if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties. But
this is too much for Wilko to bear.”).
119. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1119–20.
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to them.”120 The Court never definitively resolved this issue, instead
confining its discussion of manifest disregard to dicta by simply concluding
that “when speaking as a Court, [we] have merely taken the Wilko language
as we found it, without embellishment, and now that its meaning is
implicated, we see no reason to accord it the significance that Hall Street
urges.” 121 Accordingly, this language seemed to cast doubt on the continued
validity of manifest disregard as a non-statutory ground without
emphatically denouncing the doctrine.122 Since Hall Street, the circuit courts
have grappled with the question, disagreeing over whether or not manifest
disregard remains a valid ground for vacatur.123
B. Manifest Disregard Does Not Survive as a Valid Ground for Vacatur in
the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
Several courts have concluded that Hall Street sounded the death knell
for manifest disregard.124 Most significantly, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits have conclusively held that manifest disregard did not survive Hall
Street as a valid ground for vacatur under the FAA.125 Additionally, the First
Circuit indicated in a footnote that if the question presented itself, the Court
would likely agree and formally abolish manifest disregard.126
In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that “Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in
section 10 of the . . . [FAA], and consequently, manifest disregard of the law
is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the
FAA.” 127 The Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s vacatur of an award
when the panel of arbitrators intentionally did not follow a state law in
120. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 585.
121. Id. (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).
122. See Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 770 (“After roughly fifty years of continuous use by
the federal courts, manifest disregard was called into question by the United States Supreme Court in
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.”).
123. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1; Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 424; Gronlund, supra note 3,
at 1363.
124. See Aragaki, supra note 4, at 3 (“There are currently two broad schools of thought on the
issue. The first is that Hall Street spells the end of manifest disregard and, by implication, any other
non-statutory vacatur ground.”) (footnote omitted).
125. Weston, supra note 105, at 940.
126. Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We acknowledge the
Supreme Court’s recent holding in Hall Street that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid
ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in cases brought under the Federal Arbitration
Act.”) (citation omitted). But see Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.
2010) (declining to definitively answer the question as to whether manifest disregard had “continued
vitality . . . in FAA proceedings”).
127. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009).
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The Citigroup court found that Hall Street
reaching its decision.128
unequivocally left the statutory grounds under section 10 as the exclusive
avenue to vacatur under the FAA.129 Since the Fifth Circuit’s precedent had
categorized manifest disregard as a non-statutory ground, the court reasoned
that it could no longer use manifest disregard as a basis for vacating
awards.130
In Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
Fifth Circuit’s Citigroup rationale for discarding manifest disregard.131 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion
for vacatur or modification.132 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
district court should not have confirmed the award on the ground that the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.133 Like the Fifth Circuit before it,
the Eleventh Circuit found the language of Hall Street compelling, stating
that “our judicially-created bases for vacatur are no longer valid in light of
Hall Street.”134
In Medicine Shoppe International, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., the
Eighth Circuit became the third of the circuit courts to officially reject the
manifest disregard doctrine. Like the Eleventh Circuit in Frazier, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a motion for vacatur.135
The
Medicine Shoppe court first held that under Hall Street, courts may vacate
arbitral awards only for the reasons outlined in section 10.136 Accordingly,
the court determined that the ground alleged in the motion for vacatur was
not among those listed in § 10 and therefore was not allowable.137
C. Manifest Disregard Survived Hall Street as a Statutory Ground for
Vacatur in the Seventh, Second and Ninth Circuits
Several circuit courts have concluded that manifest disregard survived
following the Hall Street decision as a so-called judicial gloss for review

128. Id.
129. Id. at 355.
130. Id.
131. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1321.
134. Id. at 1324.
135. Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 2010).
136. Id. at 489.
137. Id. at 489.
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under FAA § 10(a).138 However, not all of these circuits have come to this
conclusion in the same manner. Prior to the decision in Hall Street, the
Seventh Circuit had already narrowly tailored its manifest disregard doctrine
to fit under section 10(a)(4). Then, after the decision in Hall Street, the
Second and Ninth Circuits attempted to accord their pre-Hall Street
precedents with the Seventh Circuit’s narrowly defined statutory
construction of manifest disregard.
1. The Seventh Circuit and Its Pre-Hall Street Statutory Construction
In 2001, the Seventh Circuit decided George Watts & Son, Inc. v.
Tiffany & Co., in which the court affirmed a district court’s denial of a
motion for vacatur.139 In the decision, Judge Frank Easterbrook questioned
whether any overriding principles existed that would authorize courts to
review the legal underpinnings—whether written or unwritten—of
arbitrators’ decisions.140 After considering whether manifest disregard could
mean something akin to review for clear error, the court determined it could
not. 141 Judge Easterbrook concluded that the “‘manifest disregard’ principle
is limited to two possibilities: an arbitral order requiring the parties to violate
the law . . . and an arbitral order that does not adhere to the legal principles
specified by contract, and hence unenforceable under [FAA] § 10(a).”142 In
other words, the Seventh Circuit confined manifest disregard to two specific
instances, in which the award contained an inherent bar to enforcement.143
Five years later, Judge Posner took the next logical step in Wise v.
Wachovia Securities LLC, affirmatively confining manifest disregard of law
to situations which “fit[] comfortably under the first clause of the fourth
statutory ground [of § 10(a)]—‘where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers.’”144 By following Judge Easterbrook’s language in George Watts,
the Wise court differentiated the Seventh Circuit from other circuits that set
aside arbitral awards based on a non-statutory approach to manifest
disregard.145 The court then affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion

138. Weston, supra note 105, at 941–42; see Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548
F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
139. George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2001).
140. Id. at 579.
141. Id. at 580.
142. Id. at 581.
143. Id.
144. Wise v. Wachovia Securities LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 2006).
145. Id. at 268–69.
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for vacatur, and Judge Posner directed the parties to the statutory grounds for
vacatur as the exclusive grounds for review.146
Although some have characterized Wise as embracing a more expansive
interpretation of section 10(a)(4),147 it is more appropriately considered as a
narrower conception of manifest disregard, since the Seventh Circuit
“confined [manifest disregard] to cases in which arbitrators ‘direct the
parties to violate the law.’”148 In other words, without more than just willful
indifference to applicable law present, the Seventh Circuit will not find
manifest disregard.149 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit became the first of
the circuit courts to limit manifest disregard to a statutory ground under
section 10(a)(4).150
2. The Second and Ninth Circuits’ Post-Hall Street Rebranding of
Manifest Disregard
Following the Supreme Court’s language regarding manifest disregard
in Hall Street, two circuit courts agreed at least nominally with the approach
of the Seventh Circuit and attempted to fit their manifest disregard doctrines
under the statutory umbrella. Namely, the Second and Ninth Circuits have
asserted that manifest disregard survived Hall Street as shorthand for
analysis under section 10(a)(4).151
In Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Second
Circuit held that Hall Street “did not . . . abrogate the ‘manifest disregard’
doctrine altogether.”152 Where the arbitrator had permitted class arbitration
despite the arbitration agreement’s silence on the matter, the district court
vacated the award because the arbitrator did not perform a meaningful

146. Id. at 269.
147. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 427 (internal quotations omitted).
148. Wise, 450 F.3d at 269 (quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577,
580 (7th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added).
149. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 12.
150. See Aragaki, supra note 4, at 4 n.25 (“Even prior to Hall Street, the Seventh Circuit had
reinterpreted manifest disregard as a statutory, rather than a common law, doctrine.”) (citing George
Watts, 248 F.3d at 581); Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 427 (“The Seventh Circuit is the only
circuit that did not view manifest disregard as a non-statutory ground for review prior to Hall
Street.”).
151. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 777.
152. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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choice-of-law analysis.153 Agreeing in principle with the Seventh Circuit’s
approach to manifest disregard, the Stolt-Nielsen court reversed the district
court’s vacatur.154
The Second Circuit laid out its new statutory conception of manifest
disregard as a sort of progeny of the Seventh Circuit’s, in which the court
bore a responsibility to vacate awards in which the arbitrator “willfully
flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.”155 In this situation, the
court reasoned, the arbitrators did not interpret the contract at all and thereby
exceeded their powers under section 10(a)(4).156 The crux of the court’s
argument revolved around the assertion that “parties do not agree in advance
to submit to arbitration that is carried out in manifest disregard of the
law.”157 Accordingly, manifest disregard review has maintained a continued
viability in the Second Circuit.
Similarly, in Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates,158 the Ninth
Circuit adopted a corresponding approach, stating that Hall Street did not
undermine prior precedent, and as a result, manifest disregard retains
Not
continued validity as a ground for vacatur under section 10(a)(4).159
wholly dissimilar to Hall Street, Comedy Club involved a complicated
procedural history, including vacation and remand by the Supreme Court for
a decision in accordance with Hall Street.160 The Comedy Club court
vacated part of a district court’s order confirming an arbitral award.161
Reasoning that the arbitrator had neither the power to bind nonparties to the
agreement by a permanent injunction nor to enforce a nationwide in-term
covenant not to compete—both in “manifest disregard” of California
Business and Professions Code (CBPC) section 16600—the Ninth Circuit
held that the arbitrator exceeded his power under section 10(a)(4).162
Consequently, like the Second Circuit, manifest disregard review continues
in the Ninth Circuit through a nomenclature of statutory construction.

153. Id. at 89–90 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
154. Id. at 95.
155. Id. (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).
159. Id. at 1281.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1287–94.
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D. Manifest Disregard Lingers as a Nonstatutory Ground for Vacatur in
the Sixth Circuit
unpublished
opinion
In Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.,163 an
decided in 2008, the Sixth Circuit left its pre-Hall Street precedent
“untouched.”164 In order to do so, the Coffee Beanery court narrowly
construed the holding in Hall Street, stating that the decision did not
foreclose judicial review for arbitral manifest disregard.165 Reasoning that
because the Supreme Court failed to definitively resolve Wilko’s meaning,
the Court’s holding pertained only to contractual supplements by private
parties. 166 As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated the award because the
arbitrator did not apply a Maryland franchise law in a dispute arising out of a
franchise agreement.167 The franchise law had required the disclosure of a
specific class of felony convictions.168 However, the arbitrator concluded
that the franchisor’s failure to disclose a grand larceny conviction was
immaterial because the franchise law did not contemplate that particular
felony. 169 The court disagreed, finding that the award displayed the
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of applicable law.170
This case is reminiscent of the tension between an arbitrator merely
misinterpreting a law or manifestly disregarding it.171 On the one hand, the
arbitrator interpreted that the felony was not of the variety contemplated by
the statute’s disclosure requirement.172 On the other, as the Sixth Circuit
pointed out, the arbitrator probably should have found the failure to disclose
material, since the statute required the disclosure of “any person identified in

163. 300 F. App 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
164. Annie Chen, Note, The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law after Hall Street:
Implications for Judicial Review of International Arbitrations in U.S. Courts, 32 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1872, 1892 (2009); see Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App at 419 (“[T]his Court will follow its wellestablished precedent here and continue to employ the ‘manifest disregard’ standard.”). In a
subsequent decision, the Sixth Circuit has apparently “retreated” slightly from its conclusion in
Coffee Beanery. Aragaki, supra note 44, at 5 n.33. See Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health
Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2008).
165. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App at 418.
166. Id. at 418–19.
167. Id. at 421.
168. Id. at 420.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 419.
171. See supra Part I.C.
172. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App at 420.

347

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013

23

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5

the prospectus [who] has been convicted of a felony . . . if the felony or civil
action involved fraud, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or
misappropriation of property.”173 Grand larceny certainly qualifies as a
misappropriation of property.174 Regardless, the tension persists because, as
Judge Oakes presciently stated, “one man’s ‘interpretation’ may be another’s
‘disregard.’”175
III. RESOLVING THE SPLIT
In order to resolve the split, the Court can consider doing two things.
First, siding with the circuits that have already discarded manifest disregard,
the doctrine should officially be abolished, and the contents of section 10
should be recognized as the exclusive grounds for vacatur under the FAA.
Second, by reconceptualizing “final” as it appears in section 10(a)(4), lower
courts will have the tools to review arbitral awards while expressly
abstaining from a de novo review on the merits. This method allows courts
to review arbitral awards following the text of the FAA without disturbing
the integrity of the benefit of the arbitration bargain.
A. Manifest Disregard Does Not “Fit” Under the FAA
Examining the history of the FAA, it becomes clear that the drafters
never envisioned the enforcement of illegal or unconscionable awards.176
Over time, however, this understanding has eroded, and courts have sought
increasing supervision of the arbitral process.177 As Professor Carbonneau
notes, pressure to change the arbitral process and provide greater protection
to individual rights has led to a variety of nonstatutory and common law
grounds for vacatur, including the use of unconscionability, actions to clarify
awards, and contract provisions that allow enhanced judicial review.178
Among common law grounds, the ambiguous and subjective manifest
disregard standard provides another potential for review that the drafters of

173. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. BUS. REG. § 14-216(8)(i)).
174. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. BUS. REG. § 14-216(8)(i)).
175. I/S Stavborg v. Nat’l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974).
176. See Joint Hearings, supra note 56, at 36 (“The courts are bound to accept and enforce the
award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common
morality, it ought not to be enforced.”); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273. While the
legislative history of the FAA is admittedly limited in scope, this language clearly indicates that the
statute never envisioned the enforcement of illegal awards or awards that might shock the
conscience.
177. Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 241–42.
178. Id.
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the FAA did not envision—a technical review of arbitral awards on their
merits. 179 Congress enacted the FAA to abrogate the old common law
doctrines hostile to arbitration agreements; manifest disregard should
likewise be invalidated as a remnant of the same ancient judicial hostility.180
To begin with, as illustrated above, manifest disregard as a nonstatutory
ground for vacatur obviates the bargained-for benefits of an arbitration
agreement.181 If manifest disregard survived Hall Street as such, then the
doctrine should be abolished on these grounds alone. However, if “manifest
disregard” is now simply shorthand for analysis under FAA § 10(a)(4) then
it is confusing and unnecessary. Judge Posner made just this point in
Baravati: “If [manifest disregard] is intended to be synonymous with the
statutory formula that it most nearly resembles . . . it is superfluous and
confusing. There is enough confusion in the law. The grounds for setting
aside arbitration awards are exhaustively stated in the statute.”182 Indeed, the
ambiguity and confusion inherent in any manifest disregard analysis means
that the terms’ use alone creates the possibility for “back door” review of
arbitral awards on their merits.183
Next, manifest disregard as defined by the Second Circuit in StoltNielsen and the Ninth Circuit in Comedy Club does not meet the definition
of arbitral excess of authority under FAA section 10(a)(4). Under the
traditional definition, arbitrators exceed their powers when they decide
issues not submitted to arbitration or when the arbitrators decline to follow
principles of adjudication set out in the agreement to arbitrate.184 In 2011,

179. Joint Hearings, supra note 56, at 36 (“There is no authority and no opportunity for the
court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should have been.”);
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (same); but cf. id. (emphasizing the importance of courts
“refus[ing] to permit the invasion of technicalities in the application of the law or the determination
of rights under it”).
180. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1110.
181. See supra Parts I.A, C.
182. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
183. For this reason, statements which include manifest disregard as a tool to enforce
arbitration agreements rather than review them should be viewed with skepticism. See, e.g.,
Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, No. 10-2111, 2012 WL 507022, at *8 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2012)
(“Whether manifest disregard is a “judicial gloss” or an independent ground for vacatur, it is not an
invitation to review the merits of the underlying arbitration.”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e view the ‘manifest disregard’ doctrine, and the
FAA itself, as a mechanism to enforce the parties’ agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial
review of the arbitrators’ decision.”)
184. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 351 (5th Cir. 2009); Hayford, supra
note 2, at 455–56; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1109 (“Arbitrators exceed their powers when they issue
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the Second Circuit defined arbitral excess of authority along these traditional
lines in Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc,185 stating that “an arbitrator may
exceed her authority by, first, considering issues beyond those the parties
have submitted for her consideration, or, second, reaching issues clearly
prohibited by law or by the terms of the parties’ agreement.”186
Additionally, an excess of arbitral power occurs when an arbitrator or
tribunal is not constituted in accordance to the terms of the arbitration
agreement.187 Since arbitration depends on party consent through the
arbitration agreement, parties confer the power to settle disputes through the
terms of their agreement.188 When the appointment of an arbitrator or
tribunal does not follow these terms, decision-making power does not confer
upon the arbitral tribunal.189 Accordingly, although an arbitrator may
determine certain issues that affect the arbitrator’s power to make an
award,190 an award will not be enforced if the arbitrator’s selection does not
follow the parties’ agreed-upon method.191 Where the parties have not
conferred the power to enter an award, the pure act of rendering one exceeds
the arbitrator’s powers.
Accepting these definitions, a problem pervades the Second and Ninth
Circuits’ conceptualizations of excess of authority. Namely, manifest
disregard situations often involve the decision of either a properly appointed
or constituted arbitrator or tribunal in which the award expressly confines
itself to the issues submitted by the parties. For example, in Comedy Club
the Ninth Circuit vacated an award on the basis of manifest disregard where
an award on an issue not presented to them in the submission to arbitration, or when they fail to
adhere to other constraining criteria prescribed by the parties, such as arbitration rules that the parties
may have drafted into their arbitration provisions . . . .”); accord H. ARTHUR DUNN & HENRY P.
DIMOND, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: BEING A COMPILATION OF AWARDS OF ARBITRATION
COMMITTEES OF VARIOUS TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 20 (1922) (“The submission [to arbitration] creates the special jurisdiction of the arbitrators,
and the award necessarily must conform thereto, else it not be considered valid.”).
185. 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011).
186. Id. at 122.
187. See Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 92
(2d Cir. 2005) (“Under the FAA, an award issued by arbitrators who are not appointed in accordance
with agreed-upon procedures may be vacated because the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers.’”).
188. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Garage Employees Union, Local 272, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d
Cir. 1986).
189. Id. (“The defect in the method used to select [the arbitrator] left him powerless to
implement the . . . Agreement.”).
190. An example of such a situation includes the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, under
which an arbitrator or tribunal has the ability or “competence” to determine its own jurisdiction. See
Natasha Wyss, Note, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to KompetenzKompetenz, 72 TUL. L. REV. 351, 352–53 (1997).
191. 72 TUL. L. REV. 351, 352–53 (1997) (citing Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th
Cir.1977)).
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the award resolved only issues submitted to the arbitrator.192 The Comedy
Club court vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his power by
enjoining nonparties to the agreement and enforcing an overly broad in-term
covenant not to compete.193 However, the arbitrator bound nonparties to the
agreement by employing the term “affiliate” as defined in the underlying
contract and enforcing the covenant as found in the contract.194 Where an
award uses the contract’s definition of a term and enforces a covenant as it
appears in the contract, both on issues submitted for determination, the
arbitrator has by definition remained within his or her delegated authority
under the arbitration agreement.195
The Second Circuit attempted to correct this inconsistency when it
asserted that, “[P]arties do not agree in advance to submit to arbitration that
is carried out in manifest disregard of the law.”196 This assertion seems to
discount the reality that any error of law could potentially be deemed
manifest disregard, since litigants will never expressly grant an arbitrator the
power to make a mistake.197 The court simply ignores the fact that the
parties delegated the authority to decide the case to an arbitrator rather than a
judge, and as such, the parties have assumed the risk that the arbitrator might
decide incorrectly.198 In addition, as frequently occurs, “submissions to
arbitration . . . do not call for the arbitrator to apply [a specific] law.”199
Within the context of these “general” submissions to arbitration, the
Second Circuit’s own Jock definition of excess of authority undermines its

192. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1287-94 (9th Cir. 2009); see
supra Part II.C.2.
193. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1283.
194. Id. at 1286–89.
195. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“As long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious errors does not suffice to overturn his
decision.”); but cf. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1109 (“For cases in which the decision is not drawn
from the essence of the contract, Section 10(a)(4) provides an adequate remedy—not because the
awards are . . . irrational, but because they exceed the scope of the authority’s authority since the
award is not drawn from the essence of the contract that the arbitrator has been authorized to
interpret by the parties.”).
196. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
197. William W. Park, The Four Musketeers of Arbitral Duty, in IS ARBITRATION ONLY AS
GOOD AS THE ARBITRATOR? STATUS, POWERS AND ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR 33 (ICC Dossiers,
Vol. 8 No. 1, 2011).
198. Park, supra note 188.
199. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1147.

351

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013

27

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5

Stolt-Nielsen argument that parties do not agree in advance to manifest
disregard. When parties do not specify a law to which the arbitral analysis
must adhere, arbitrators may commit errors of law without rendering a
decision unauthorized by the parties, so long as the arbitrators only decide
issues submitted to them.200 In such a situation, the arbitrators have not
exceeded their authority to make the determination.201
Professor Reuben
takes this point one step further:
Because the arbitrator is not required to follow the law, it makes little sense to evaluate
the arbitrator’s decision on the basis of how well it complies with the law. Indeed, if the
arbitral decision is not based on law and is instead based on some other norm, such as
industry custom or practice, manifest disregard effectively constitutes a substitution of
202
judgment by the court for the decision of the arbitrator.

By holding an arbitrator to a legal construction where the parties have not
specified these or any other guidelines in their agreement, courts effectively
vitiate the arbitrator’s bargained-for determination.203
As a result, review for manifest disregard of law does not fit into FAA
section 10(a)(4) review for an arbitrator’s excess of authority.204
Additionally, these courts have not in reality changed their manifest
disregard analysis to adapt to the new statutory configuration under
section 10(a)(4).205 Scholars and practitioners alike have found this doctrinal
approach troubling.206 Affixing the label “dog” to a cat does not suddenly
make the animal a canine.
Furthermore, looking at section 10(a)(4) from a “textualist” approach,
the subsection differentiates between arbitrators “exceed[ing] their powers”
separating
and arbitrators “imperfectly execut[ing]” those powers.207 By
these two possible rationales with a comma and “or,” the statute makes clear

200. Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2011).
201. Id.
202. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1149.
203. Cf. id. at 1147 (“Manifest disregard has no place in the modern structure of arbitration for
general submissions to arbitration . . . .”).
204. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 10; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1144 (“[M]anifest disregard review
should not be viewed as synonymous with exceeding-power review.”).
205. See supra Part II.C.2.
206. See e.g., Aragaki, supra note 4, at 10 (“[T]he statutory approach invites doctrinal
complications. One such complication may arise because courts have largely continued to use preHall Street manifest disregard precedents without questioning whether they are appropriate in a
statutory manifest disregard regime.”); Christopher Walsh, Stolt-Nielsen’s Comfort for the “Average
Arbitrator”: An Analysis of the Post-Hall Street “Manifest Disregard” Award Review Standard, 27
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 19, 21 (2009) (finding it “troubling” that “the Second Circuit
continues to apply the doctrine as it was developed before Hall Street when it was considered by the
Second Circuit to be an extrastatutory basis for vacatur”).
207. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
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that the grounds exist distinct from one another.208 The Second Circuit’s
attempt to grandfather its pre-Hall Street manifest disregard law into a postHall Street statutory regime improperly combines the two distinct grounds,
further perpetuating the confused and muddled conception of vacatur under
section 10(a)(4). Accordingly, in the words of Professor Reuben, “the ghost
of manifest disregard” should be laid to rest.209
B. Reconceptualizing a “Final” Award Under Section 10(a)(4)
The traditional views of the finality of arbitral awards fall short of the
fundamental nature of arbitration, finality as interpreted in the international
courts
context, and the intentions of the FAA’s drafters.210 Consequently,
have sought to expand and define their roles in policing arbitral awards
through means such as manifest disregard of the law.211 This
reconceptualization seeks to remedy the shortcomings by envisioning a twostep process. First, enforceability must be considered as a criteria of a
“final” award under section 10(a)(4).212 Next, the use of section 11(c)
should be expanded to include instances where a court determines that an
award does not meet the requirement of enforceability, but modifying the
terms of the award will not disturb its merits. By reconceptualizing the
procedure for enforcing and modifying awards, courts will have at least the
superficial control over arbitral awards they crave, but in a manner that
excludes reviewing the merits of the decision.
1. A “Final” Award Under Section 10(a)(4) Must Be Enforceable
FAA section 10(a)(4) allows courts to vacate an arbitral award “[w]here
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not

208. Id.; accord Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 268 (“[I]f [the arbitrators] exceeded their
powers or failed to make a mutual, final or definite award, then and then only the award may be
vacated.”) (emphasis added).
209. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1146.
210. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text; see infra Parts I.C & III.B.1.
211. See supra Part I.D.
212. Such a construction simply reflects the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that, “[t]he
federal [arbitration] policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private
agreements to arbitrate.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989). After all, “[t]he private practice of arbitration [is] of little practical use without
the authority of court enforcement . . . .” Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748.
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made.” 213 As mentioned, the traditional conceptualization of a “final” award
under this section has remained largely procedural in nature.214
Reconceptualization does not seek to change that. Instead, it seeks to expand
the traditional concept to include and implement the words of Julius Henry
Cohen, one of the principal drafters of the FAA, when he stated, “[t]he
judgment so entered [under FAA section 9] is subject to the same provisions
of law as any other judgment, whether as to enforcement, appeal therefrom,
or in any other respect.”215 In other words, in order for an arbitral award to
be considered “final” under section 10(a)(4), the award must be enforceable
in the same manner as any public judgment.
As previously noted, the drafters of the FAA did not consider the
possibility that courts would enforce illegal or immoral arbitral awards under
the putative authority of the FAA.216 Under this reconceptualization, if a
court cannot enforce an arbitral award on the ground that the award itself
violates a law, the award is not final; if a court refuses to enforce an award
adding
on other public policy grounds, the award is not final.217 By
“enforceability” to the traditional conceptualization of “final,” the Seventh
Circuit’s definition of manifest disregard fits nicely under section 10(a)(4)
without requiring the confused designation of manifest disregard as
shorthand or judicial gloss. Thus, courts will put into effect Judge Posner’s

213. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
214. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing that the parties’ dispute must be
resolved to such an extent that they need not litigate further to finalize their obligations).
Additionally, judicial interpretation of “final” has been said to track the “final judgment rule,” which
denies appellate review of interlocutory appeals. Jennifer M. Rhodes, Judicial Review of Partial
Arbitral Awards Under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 663, 664
(2003). For a broad examination and discussion of judicial interpretation of section 10(a)(4) “final”
paralleling the final judgment rule, see generally id.
215. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 269 (emphasis added).
216. See Joint Hearings, supra note 56, at 36 (“The courts are bound to accept and enforce the
award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common
morality, it ought not to be enforced.”); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (same).
217. For examples of arbitral awards which courts do not enforce on public policy grounds, see
Reuben, supra note 3, at 1141–43. Professor Reuben argues for the elimination all nonstatutory or
common law grounds for vacatur except for those awards vacated on public policy grounds. Reuben,
supra note 3. The argument for the continued viability of a public policy exception to § 10(a)’s
exclusivity sounds remarkably similar to the Seventh Circuit’s narrow statutory definition of
manifest disregard of the law. Compare Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2006)
(confining manifest disregard to “cases in which arbitrators ‘direct the parties to violate the law”)
(quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001)), with
Reuben, supra note 3, at 1141–43 (“It seems likely that courts will recognize a public policy
exception to the seemingly strict rule of Hall Street, at least for illegal arbitration awards.”). The
argument for reconceptualization of what constitutes a final award under section 10(a)(4)
encompasses both Professor Reuben’s exception and the Seventh Circuit’s manifest disregard model,
making the need for either designation unnecessary.
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admonition that “[w]e can understand neither the need for the [manifest
disregard] formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration
(we suspect none—that it is just words).”218
2. Section 11(c) as a Tool to Enable Courts to Effect Arbitral Intent
and Promote Justice Among the Parties
In instances where courts find arbitral awards unenforceable, the courts
should have greater leeway to modify the award to make it enforceable.
Courts should employ this authority under FAA section 11(c) as long as the
modification does not affect the merits of the award.219 The argument that
courts should utilize section 11 in conjunction with section 10 finds support
in two places. One, the language of both the first and second grounds for
vacatur under section 10(a)(4) relate to and parallel sections 11(b) and (c),
respectively.220 Two, the language of section 11 clearly voices its support
for this proposition.
The language of sections 10(a)(4) and 11 parallel each other in two
ways. First, section 10(a)(4)’s reference to an arbitrator’s excess of
authority relates directly to authorization of a court to modify under
section 11(b), in which the arbitrators have decided a matter not in the
submission to arbitration.221 Although section 11(b) does not use the terms
“exceeded their powers” or similar constructions, the section nonetheless
employs the traditional definition of arbitral excess of authority.222 Second,
sections 10(a)(4) and 11(c) refer to “imperfect[] execut[ion]” and an arbitral
award as being “imperfect in matter of form” as grounds for vacatur and
modification, respectively.223 The parallel of both language and concepts
between these subsections supports their contemplated use in conjunction

218. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
219. FAA section 11(c) allows for an order modifying or correcting an award “[w]here the
award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.” 9 U.S.C. § 11(c)
(2006).
220. See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text (describing separate grounds for vacatur
as flowing from two distinct clauses under section 10(a)(4)).
221. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (authorizing vacatur “where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers”), with 9 U.S.C. § 11(b) (authorizing modification “[w]here the arbitrators have awarded
upon a matter not submitted to them”).
222. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the traditional definition of
arbitrators exceeding their power as arbitrators issuing awards on issues not submitted for
determination, or arbitrators failing to follow other constraining criteria prescribed by the parties).
223. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(4), 11(c).
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with one another, or, at worst, that the two sections are not incompatible
with one another.
Defining the FAA section’s impetus, section 11 states that the court may
make an order to “modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent
thereof and promote justice between the parties.”224 Julius Henry Cohen
echoed this sentiment, reaffirming its importance within the context of
section 11.225 Accordingly, courts should utilize section 11—and subsection
11(c) in particular—as a tool to effect the award’s intent, rather than simply
as a means to correct typos and miscalculations.226
The argument for expanded use of section 11(c) as a tool should not
extend beyond modifications a court can make without affecting the merits
of the award. As such, a court should look only to the award itself to
determine (1) the award’s finality (enforceability) and, (2) only where
necessary, whether modification will not affect the merits of the decision. To
accomplish this task, judicial modification made under section 11 should not
extend beyond accepted contract interpretation techniques.
Judges interpret a multitude of contracts.227 There is no reason to
believe they could not apply the same accepted contract interpretation
techniques to successfully modify awards without delving into the merits of
the matter.228 Such methodology would be analogous to the FAA’s
pronouncement in section 2 that arbitration agreements “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in

224. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
225. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (“Correction or modification is so to be made
as to effect the intent of the award and to promote justice.”).
226. Many courts have relegated FAA section 11 to the status of spell-check or calculator,
correcting miscalculations and other readily apparent errors under the authority of § 11(a). See
CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 81 (“Under Section Eleven, U.S. federal courts, upon the request of
one of the parties, have the power to modify or correct awards for inadvertent technical errors that
might preclude enforcement . . . The errors in question must be ‘evident’ and unrelated to the merits
of the determination. The provision has not become a source of litigious obfuscation.”).
227. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 289, 290 (2005) (“We . . . observe that the courts actively engage in the interpretation of
contracts. The courts fill gaps in contracts, resolve conflicts and ambiguities in language, and
sometimes replace the parties’ express terms (such as to permit substitution of material B if a
problem with A occurs).”) (citation omitted).
228. See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When Is Contract Interpretation a
Legal Question and When Is It a Fact Question?, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81, 85–86 (2010)
(describing two different traditions for contract interpretation, the “traditional” view—where “there
was . . . a notion that deciphering language was a lawyerly function”—and the “modern” view—held
as a “quest to determine what the parties intended”). Under the traditional view of contract
interpretation, analogous to the task of statutory interpretation, the legal question is that of
construing language. Id. at 84. It is within this context that federal judges—who are well-versed in
contract interpretation—should modify otherwise unenforceable awards and bring them within the
realm of enforceability.
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equity for the revocation of any contract.”229 Doing so would keep any
judicial frolicking to a minimum and within section 11’s stated goal of
achieving the parties’ intent and promoting justice between them.230
This
approach also accords with Cohen’s statements that section 11 allows “no
opportunity for technical procedure.”231 Furthermore, this approach does not
run afoul of functus officio as the award never returns to the arbitrators,
while at the same time bearing a striking resemblance to the exceptions
already carved out of that doctrine.232 By allowing a judge to simply look to
the award to determine its enforceability, thereby removing the need to
remand awards back to arbitration for further proceedings, the solution
plainly promotes efficiency in the total arbitration process.
The decision in Comedy Club provides the perfect opportunity to
reconceptualize an analysis under FAA sections 10(a)(4) and 11(c) as well
as to clarify the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to shoehorn pre-Hall Street manifest
disregard doctrine into a purported statutory construction.
C. Resolution in Practice – Comedy Club Reconceptualized
In deciding Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, the Ninth
Circuit made two major findings that affected the award at issue in the case.
First, the court determined that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his
authority by enjoining nonparties to the agreement.233 Next, the court found
that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by enforcing an interm covenant not to compete over an excessively broad area of land.234 As
previously noted, however, it is problematic to state that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority in this situation.235
In actuality, the arbitrator
confined his decision to the express terms of the contract by issuing an
injunction with the term “affiliate” as defined in the contract, and enforcing
as drafted the contractual in-term covenant not to compete.236
229. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
230. 9 U.S.C. § 11
231. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (“[I]n no case do [the provisions of § 11] act as a
bar to informal and expert determination of the matter.”).
232. See infra Part I.C.
233. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2009).
234. Id. at 1293.
235. See supra Part III.A.
236. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1286–89 (The decision finds fault with the arbitral award on
the basis of the arbitrator’s use of the term “affiliate” as defined in the contract, explaining the
arbitrator’s decision as “keeping in force the restrictive covenant” as drafted in the contract).
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Another inherent problem with the Comedy Club decision involves the
procedural characterization by which the court purported to act. Though the
Ninth Circuit claimed to vacate on grounds of manifest disregard, the court
then remanded to the district court with instructions to immediately reinstate
the award, albeit in a diluted form.237 Read in this light, it appears the Ninth
Circuit in fact modified rather than vacated the award. As such, the court
should have looked to section 11 rather than the post-Hall Street,
section 10(a)(4) version of manifest disregard upon which it relied.238
Reconceptualization under section 10(a)(4) is superior to the Ninth
Circuit’s construction because it remains faithful to the parties’ bargain and
refrains from arbitrarily substituting a court’s opinion for an arbitrator’s.
Additionally, reconceptualization would have required the court to conduct a
narrower review than what actually occurred and left the merits of the
decision undisturbed. By examining the award alone, the court cannot
expand the scope of its review to include a full review on the merits
“smuggle[d] . . . in by the back door.”239
1. Step One: Determining the Award’s Finality (Enforceability)
To begin with, the Ninth Circuit did not, and should not have concluded
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing a permanent
injunction.240 Instead, the offense related to the scope of the permanent
injunction.241 Accordingly, the court should have simply concluded that
because the contract’s definition of the term “affiliate” violated CBPC
section 16600, the award was unenforceable as written. Next, the Ninth
Circuit should not have described its decision to limit the in-term covenant
not to compete as a vacatur on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his
power by manifestly disregarding CBPC section 16600.242 Instead, the court
should have followed an almost identical reconceptualized vacatur analysis
as with the permanent injunction. Since the breadth of the in-term covenant
not to compete violated CBPC section 16600, the court simply could not

237. See id. at 1294 (“We vacate the district court’s order confirming the arbitration award and
remand to the district court with instructions to vacate the Partial Final Arbitration Award in so far
as it enjoins CCI’s Affiliates, unless they are agents or otherwise acting for CCI, and to the extent it
prevents CCI from opening or operating non-Improv clubs in counties in which CCI does not now
operate or own an Improv club.”).
238. Id. at 1289–94.
239. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
240. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1286.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1293.
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enforce the award.243 By finding the award unenforceable, the court would
have thereby determined that the arbitrators imperfectly executed their
powers by not issuing a final and definite award.244
2. Step Two: Modifying the Award
Finding the award unenforceable and therefore not final, the court would
have then moved on to step two of the reconceptualized analysis. In this
step, the court would have asked: was the award “imperfect in matter of
form not affecting the merits of the controversy”?245 Since the first issue
that the Ninth Circuit found offensive in the award amounted to the
excessive scope of a single defined term,246 the court likely would have
answered in the affirmative. In its decision, the Comedy Club court
essentially employed a blue-pencil test,247 editing the definition of “affiliate”
by striking out the definition’s overreaching portion so that it conformed to
the standards of section 16600 of California Business and Profession
Code.248 The blue-pencil test falls within the category of equitable contract
interpretation and construction techniques discussed previously as a method
to limit ambiguity and potential judicial frolicking.249
Next, the court would have asked: was the award as it related to the
second issue—the overly broad in-term covenant not to compete—
”imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy”?250
Since a simple modification of the in-term covenant not to compete effected
the intent of the award and promoted justice without affecting the merits, the
court likely would have again answered in the affirmative. Analogous to the
use of the blue-pencil test on the preceding definition, the Comedy Club

243. Id.
244. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
245. 9 U.S.C. § 11(c).
246. See Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1286 (“[P]recluding non-party relatives or ex-spouses from
opening or operating improv-comedy-related businesses or restaurants violates CBPC [section]
16600 . . . By restricting non-party relatives and ex-spouses from engaging in a lawful business, the
injunctions, with respect to those persons exceed the arbitrator’s authority.”).
247. “A judicial standard for deciding whether to invalidate the whole contract or only the
offending words. Under this standard, only the offending words are invalidated if it would be
possible to delete them simply by running a blue pencil through them, as opposed to changing,
adding, or rearranging words.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 196 (9th ed. 2009).
248. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1287–88.
249. See supra Part III.B.2.
250. 9 U.S.C. § 11(c).
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court simply limited the scope of the covenant to counties where Comedy
Club, Inc.’s improv clubs currently operate.251
These actions by the Ninth Circuit in Comedy Club perfectly illustrate a
court’s ability “to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the
parties” “[w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy.”252 By simply approaching these edits as
modifications to an otherwise unenforceable arbitral award, the Ninth
Circuit would have refrained from performing a de novo merits review and
avoided characterizing the award as an excess of authority. To the extent
that an aggrieved party—against whom a court modifies an award—
disagrees with a modification, the party still has full access to the appellate
process of the courts.253 Once illustrated, the reconceptualization’s utility
becomes readily apparent, replacing the ambiguity of manifest disregard
with a straight-forward standard of review under the FAA. At the same
time, the analysis promotes rather than compromises arbitral finality by
confining judicial review to the award only, thereby protecting and
maintaining the integrity of arbitration’s benefit of the bargain.
CONCLUSION
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hall Street in 2008, the lower
courts have grappled with the Court’s assertion about the exclusivity of FAA
sections 10 and 11 for vacatur and modification of arbitral awards. When
coupled with the Court’s apparent uneasiness with the foundation of
manifest disregard in Wilko, circuit courts have split over the continued
validity of manifest disregard as ground for vacatur. However, one thing is
clear: based on the history and ambiguity inherent in the manifest disregard
doctrine, any remnant of the doctrine serves to frustrate one of the critical
benefits of the arbitration bargain: finality.
With the current split among the circuit courts, the state of the law of
manifest disregard remains suspended, awaiting a conclusive declaration
from the Supreme Court. When the Court makes this decision, by
reconceptualizing a “final” award under FAA section 10(a)(4) and allowing
an increased power to modify for enforceability under section 11(c), the
Court can provide a tool to lower courts that will allow them to have some
251. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1293.
252. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
253. Indeed, Julius Henry Cohen trumpeted this point in his description of the new federal
arbitration process: “When the award has been entered as a judgment, of course, an appeal may be
taken as from an ordinary judgment in an action, and similarly an appeal may be taken from an order
vacating, modifying, or correcting the award though the statute does not specifically prescribe this.”
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273.
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semblance of supervision over arbitral awards while leaving the merits of the
awards undisturbed. When parties contract for arbitration, they agree on a
gamble. However, not all gambles pay off, and the FAA already safeguards
the procedural fairness required to maintain the integrity of arbitration
proceedings. By reconceptualizing the traditional notion of finality, courts
will put their supervisory tools to better use.
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